Socialism is strictly “impossible.” Its impracticability is not, as Bryan Caplan has suggested, a “quantitative” matter, nor does he show that real‐world socialism's incentive problems outweighed its informational ones. Caplan's criticism of Ludwig von Mises's critique of the “possibility” of socialism fails to appreciate what he meant by “socialism” and misunderstands Mises's argument about economic calculation. History, too, suggests that socialism's informational deficiency was the most significant problem facing those who tried to implement socialism.

Socialism is strictly “impossible.” Its impracticability is not, as Bryan Caplan has suggested, a “quantitative” matter, nor does he show that real‐world socialism's incentive problems outweighed its informational ones. Caplan's criticism of Ludwig von Mises's critique of the “possibility” of socialism fails to appreciate what he meant by “socialism” and misunderstands Mises's argument about economic calculation. History, too, suggests that socialism's informational deficiency was the most significant problem facing those who tried to implement socialism.

James C. Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia argues that the Zomia people of Southeast Asia consciously chose to live without government and that their choice was sensible. Yet basic economic reasoning, reflected in Hobbes’s classic account of anarchy and the state’s emergence, suggests that life without government would be far worse than life with government, leading people to universally choose the latter. To reconcile Scott’s account of the Zomia peoples’ choice with (...) this reasoning, it is necessary to elaborate the mechanisms of private governance that could make life under anarchy tolerable and thus plausibly render statelessness a sensible option. To deliver a powerful, rather than glancing, blow to Hobbesian thinking, this essay argues that anarchist histories must focus on governance mechanisms. (shrink)

While markets are all around us, not all markets are the same. Markets come in a variety of colors based on the legality of activities in the specific market. As such, there is no market economy per se, but instead various shades of markets. The different shades of markets that are evidenced in practice directly depend on the institutional environment that makes certain activities legal or illegal. Shifts in the institutional environment are a result of entrepreneurial activity over the rules (...) of the game. The rules of the game and resulting shade of the market in turn impact entrepreneurs acting within those rules and hence economic development or the lack thereof.L’économie de marché est en réalité une économie des marchés. La variété des marchés s’explique par la légalité des activités sur chacun d’entre eux. Ainsi il n’existe pas une économie de marché en soi, mais plutôt plusieurs formes de marché. Ces formes manifestes de marché sont fonction de l’environnement institutionnel qui rend certaines activités légales ou illégales. Les changements de l’environnement institutionnel sont le résultat de l’activité entrepreneuriale en dehors des règles du jeu. Les règles du jeu ainsi que la forme du marché qui leur est associée influencent à leur tour les actions entrepreneuriales et donc le développement économique. (shrink)